

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 142020
ORIGIN EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-13 ISO-00 ACDA-12 SOE-02 AF-10 ARA-10
CIAE-00 DODE-00 EA-10 PM-05 H-01 INR-10 L-03
NASA-01 NEA-11 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01
DOE-15 CEQ-01 OES-07 SS-15 ICA-11 NRC-05 TRSE-00
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DRAFTED BY EUR/RPM:JGREENWALD
APPROVED BY EUR:MR.VEST
NSC:DR. THOMSEN
DOD/ISA:MGBOWMAN
EUR:JEGOODBY
EUR/RPM:SJLEDOGAR
S/S:MR. ANDERSON

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P 060056Z JUN 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
CINCLANT NORFOLK
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN GERMANY
CINNCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GERMANY
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON ENGLAND
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GERMANY
USLOSACLANT NORFOLK
USNMR SHAPE BELGIUM
USDOCOCENT NAPLES ITALY
CINCNORTH KOLSASS NORWAY
USDELMC BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 142020

E.O. 11652:GDS
CONFIDENTIAL

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TAGS: NATO, NAC

SUBJECT: WASHINGTON NATO SUMMIT: PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON
DEFENSE ISSUES, MORNING SESSION MAY 31.

FOLLOWING IS FULL TEXT OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S STATEMENT
ON DEFENSE ISSUES DELIVERED TO RESTRICTED SUMMIT SESSION
MORNING OF MAY 31BEGIN TEXT:

THESE BRIEFINGS ILLUSTRATE THE MAGNITUDE OF THE CHALLENGES

WE FACE. THEY DO NOT JUSTIFY ALARM. BUT THEY SHOULD STRENGTHEN OUR RESOLVE.

WHEN I TOOK OFFICE 16 MONTHS AGO, I REVIEWED THE CONDITON OF U.S. DEFENSES. I FOUND THEM STRONG, ALTHOUGH NEEDING IMPROVEMENTS. IN PARTICULAR, I CONCLUDED THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD GIVE TOP PRIORITY TO EUROPE, ESPECIALLY THE CONVENTIONAL DEFENSES NEEDED IN THE INITIAL STAGES OF A CONFLICT.

I REACHED THIS CONCLUSION FOR TWO REASONS. FIRST, THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY THE SOVIET UNION, HAVE STEADILY EXPANDED AND MODERNIZED THEIR CONVENTIONAL FORCES BEYOND ANY LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENT FOR DEFENSE. THEY ARE NOW ABLE TO ATTACK WITH LARGE ARMORED FORCES MORE RAPIDLY THAN WE PREVIOUSLY BELIEVED. SECOND ALTHOUGH US NUCLEAR FORCES REMAIN STRONG AND ARE FUNDAMENTAL TO DETERRENCE, THE LONG-RECOGNIZED ROLE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN DETERRENCE OF WAR IS INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT.

AS A RESULT, I DIRECTED THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO STRENGTHEN INITIAL CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE CAPACITY IN EUROPE. CONFIDENTIAL

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OF COURSE, SUCH EFFORTS WOULD AMOUNT TO LITTLE UNLESS ACCOMPANIED BY IMPROVEMENTS IN THE CONVENTIONAL CAPACITY OF OUR NATO ALLIES. EUROPEAN NATO COUNTRIES, NOT THE UNITED STATES, PROVIDE THE BULK OF OUR MILITARY FORCES IN EUROPE. ALSO, THE COMPETING DEMANDS OF OUR FREE SOCIETIES LIMIT THE RESOURCES WE CAN USE FOR DEFENSE. THEREFORE, WE MUST COORDINATE OUR DEFENSE PLANNING TO MAKE THE BEST USE OF THESE LIMITED RESOURCES.

FROM OUR DISCUSSIONS IN LONDON LAST YEAR, I KNOW THAT YOU SHARE MY VIEW OF THE CHALLENGES WE FACE. THE ANSWERS WE HAVE DEVELOPED TOGETHER ARE IMPRESSIVE. WE ARE MAKING SIGNIFICANT REAL INCREASES IN OUR DEFENSE BUDGETS. WE ARE STRENGTHENING OUR NATIONAL FORCES -- AND WE WILL DO MORE. FINALLY, WE HAVE DESIGNED A BOLD LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM TO PULL TOGETHER A MORE EFFECTIVE COLLECTIVE DEFENSE.

AS WE IMPROVE OUR CONVENTIONAL DEFENSES, WE MUST REMEMBER THAT THE STRENGTH OF OUR STRATEGIC AND THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES IS FUNDAMENTAL TO DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE. THESE FORCES ARE -- AND WILL BE -- FULLY ADEQUATE. ARMS CONTROL CAN MAKE DETERRENCE MORE STABLE AND PERHAPS LESS BURDENSOME -- BUT IT WILL NOT, IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, ELIMINATE THE NEED FOR NUCLEAR FORCES.

FOR YEARS, THE ALLIANCE HAS RELIED PRINCIPALLY ON AMERICAN STRATEGIC FORCES FOR DETERRING NUCLEAR ATTACK

ON EUROPE. THIS MEANS THAT AN ATTACK ON EUROPE WOULD HAVE THE FULL CONSEQUENCES OF AN ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES. LET THERE BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING. THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO USE ALL THE FORCES NECESSARY FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE NATO AREA.

AS AN ALLIANCE, WE MUST CONTINUE TO REVIEW OUR NUCLEAR DETERRENCE NEEDS IN LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET
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NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES. FOR THIS REASON, I AM PLEASED THAT AS ONE RESULT OF THE LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM, THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP IS EXAMINING IN DETAIL THE MODERNIZING OF OUR THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES, INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS. I ALSO FEEL THAT WE NEED SOON TO CONSIDER JOINTLY THE RELATIONS OF LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS TO ARMS CONTROL.

THIS WILL REQUIRE CONSIDERING THE FULL SCOPE OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY ISSUES, AND BEING SURE THAT WE MAINTAIN THE COUPLING OF AMERICAN STRATEGIC FORCES TO THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE. AS WE EXAMINE THIS TOGETHER, I ASSURE YOU THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL PROTECT THE OPTIONS BEFORE US AS THE SALT II NEGOTIATIONS MOVE TOWARD COMPLETION.

LET ME NOW TURN TO CONVENTIONAL FORCES -- THE BULK OF THE LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM. AFER ALL, OUR LARGEST EXPENDITURES ARE FOR CONVENTIONAL, NOT NUCLEAR FORCES.

WE MUST PREPARE TO FIGHT MORE EFFECTIVELY TOGETHER AS AN ALLIANCE. WE MUST MARKEDLY IMPROVE OUR ABILITY TO WORK TOGETHER ON THE BATTLEFIELD. WE SHOULD OVERCOME UN-NECESSARY DUPLICATION IN OUR NATIONAL PROGRAMS, THUS BUYING MORE SECURITY FOR THE SAME MONEY.

THAT IS WHAT THE LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM IS ALL ABOUT.IT

IS AN UNPRECEDENTED ATTEMPT BY NATO TO LOOK ACROSS A LONGER SPAN OF YEARS THAN EVER BEFORE. IT SEEKS A MORE COOPERATIVE COURSE, AS THE ONLY SENSIBLE WAY TO IMPROVE OUR DEFENSES WITHOUT INCREASES IN DEFENSE SPENDING
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LARGER THAN ARE READILY POSSIBLE. IT LAYS OUT SPECIFIC MEASURES OF ALLIANCE COOPERATION. IT IS THE BLUEPRINT WE NEED, AND WE MUST CARRY IT OUT VIGOROUSLY.

OF COURSE, EACH OF US DEPENDS ON LEGISLATIVE APPROVAL

FOR PARTICULAR PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS WITHIN THE LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM. BECAUSE WE LEAD DEMOCRACIES, WE CANNOT BIND OUR PEOPLE BY FIAT. WE CAN, HOWEVER -- AND I PROPOSE WE DO THIS TODAY -- PLEDGE TO DO WHAT IS NECESSARY TO SECURE THIS APPROVAL AND MAKE THIS PROGRAM WORK.

THE UNITED STATES IS ALREADY RESPONDING TO MANY LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM RECOMMENDATIONS, PARTICULARLY IN THE FIELD OF REINFORCEMENT. AND THE RECOMMENDATIONS WILL RECEIVE THE HIGHEST PRIORITY IN OUR OWN NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAMMING. IN SHORT, WE WILL DO OUR PART IN ADAPTING OR MODIFYING U.S. PROGRAMS TO SUPPORT THE NATO LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM. I AM CONFIDENT THAT YOU WILL TAKE SIMILAR ACTION.

FINALLY, I WANT TO MENTION THE ONE REMAINING UNRESOLVED ASPECT OF THE LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM. ALTHOUGH THE PROGRAM CALLS FOR NEW AND UNPRECEDENTED ALLIANCE COOPERATION, NO PROCEDURES HAVE YET BEEN DEvised FOR ENSURING THAT IT IS CARRIED OUT. NATO'S HISTORY IS REplete WITH BOLD PROGRAMS HEARTILY ENDORSED -- THEN LARGELY IGNORED. THE REPORT BEFORE US DIRECTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO PRESENT FOR NATIONAL REVIEW WHAT CHANGES ARE ESSENTIAL FOR VIGOROUS FOLLOW-THROUGH.

BOTH THE NATO TASK FORCES AND WE AMERICANS HAVE MADE SEVERAL SPECIFIC PROPOSALS TO THIS END. FOR EXAMPLE, WE FAVOR EXPLICITLY RECOGNIZING NATO'S NEW FOCUS ON LOGISTICS BY CREATING A NEW ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL FOR LOGISTICS. WE ALSO FAVOR CLEAR ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR EACH PROGRAM TO ONE NATO BODY. WHERE
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IN CONCLUDING, LET ME STATE THAT WE CONFRONT A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO BRING OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS CLOSER TOGETHER. THE RESULT WILL BE A MORE EFFECTIVE DEFENSE. THE CONSEQUENCES WILL BE GREATER SECURITY FOR OUR PEOPLE. IT

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PAGE 01 STATE 142020
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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /013 R

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APPROVED BY:EUR/RPM:PBSWIERS

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R 062300Z JUN 78

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0000

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 142020

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 142020 SENT ACTION USNATO INFO ALL NATO
CAPITALS MOSCOW USUN NEW YORK USDEL MBFR VIENNA CINCLANT
CINCUSAFE CINCUSAREUR CINCUSNAVEUR USCINCEUR USLOSACLANT UNSNMR
SHAPE USDOCOCENT CINCNORTH USDELMC BRUSELS JUN 06.
QUOTE C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 142020

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OR MODIFYING U.S. PROGRAMS TO SUPPORT THE NATO LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM. I AM CONFIDENT THAT YOU WILL TAKE SIMILAR ACTION.

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUDKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0000
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 142020

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 142020 ACTION USNATO INFO ALL NATO CAPS
MOSCOW USUN MBFR VIENNA CINCLANT NORFOLK, CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN,
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG, CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON, USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN,
USLOSACLANT NORFOLK, USNMR SHAPE, USDOCOCENT NAPLES, CINCNORTH
KOLSASS NORWAY, USDELMC BRUSSELS JUNE 6.

QUOTE O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 142020

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 26 sep 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: SUMMIT MEETINGS, DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 06 jun 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978STATE142020
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